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THE COURT OP APPEALS, 1954 TERM
The Canadian law, 42 to a violation of which the petitioner in the instant
case pleaded guilty and which formed the basis for the revocation of his license,
covered much more than merely operating a motor vehicle while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor, it included such offenses as driving while ability
is impaired by drugs, and having the care and control of a motor vehicle not in
motion when ability to drive is impaired by liquor or drugs. To ascertain the
offense of which a person has been convicted the court may look only to the
certificate of conviction, 43 which here recited Section 285 subdivision 4(a) of the
Canadian Criminal Code. Since the factual situation for which petitioner might
have been convicted does not of necessity fall into the provision of Section 71,
subdivision 2 (b) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, the petitioner was entitled to
retain his license. 4
A weak dissent merely disputed the applicability of People v. Olah;45 this
dissent has little basis in law, and seems over-influenced by a desire to cut the
automobile accident rate..
License Suspension for Habitual or Persistent Violation
In Ross v. Mac Duff, 41 the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles suspended
appellee's license to operate a motor vehicle "for habitual or persistent violation"
of the traffic laws pursuant to the Vehicle and Traffic Law. 47 This determination
was annulled by the Appellate Division4 s because of an absence of any proof in
the record that petitioner had been warned of the consequences with respect to his
operator's license, in conformance with section 335-a of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, upon two occasions when he pleaded guilty to speeding. Accordingly, the
Appellate Division felt these convictions could not be used as grounds for suspension of his license. Without considering them, the minimum number of points
required to find appellee an habitual or persistent violator under the commissioner's
point system could not be obtained. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate
Division holding first that the "habitual or persistent violation" provision was
constitutional against an attack that legislative functions had been delegated to an
administrative body without providing any adequate standards defining the words
"habitual" or "persistent", and secondly that section 335-a of the Code of Criminal
Procedure required a magistrate's warning only in cases where there was power
to suspend or revoke a license as the direct result of a conviction on the particular
charge presently before the court.
42. CANADIAN CRIMINAL CODE, §285, subd. 4 (a).
43. People v. Olah, 300 N. Y. 96, 89 N. E. 2d 329 (1949).
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. 309 N. Y. 56, 127 N. E. 2d 806 (1955).
47. N. Y. VEHICLE & TRAFFIc LAW §71, subd. 3, par. (d).
48. Ross v. Mac Duff, 284 App. Div. 900, 134 N. Y. S. 2d 401 (2d Dep't 1954).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Licenses and certificates of registration may be suspended or revoked for
"habitual or persistent violation" of any of the provisions of a traffic law. 49 The
legislative power of this state is vested in the Senate and Assembly,5" and for
an administrative body to carry out validly the provisions of a statute enacted by
the legislature "guides and proper standards" must be maintained in the statute
itself.5 ' The "habitual or persistent violation" provision of the Vehicle and Traffic
Law complies with these criteria. 52 "Where it is difficult or impractical for the
Legislature to lay down a definite comprehensive rule, a reasonable amount of
discretion may be delegated to administrative officials."" 3 "The judicial approval
accorded these broad standards for administrative action is a reflection on the
necessities of modern legislation . . . The legislative process would frequently bog
down if Congress were constitutionally required to appraise beforehand the myriad
of situations to which it wishes a particular policy to be applied and to formulate
specific rules for each situation... ,54

Section 335-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that a magistrate,
upon arraignment in this state of a resident charged with a traffic law violation
and before accepting a plea, must instruct the defendant at the time of arraignment
in substance as follows: "If you are convicted not only will you be liable to a
penalty, but in addition your license to drive a motor vehicle... and your certificate
of registration, if any, are subject to suspension and revocation as prescribed by
law."55 No suspension or revocation of a license or certificate of registration will
be made because of a judgment of conviction if the suspending or revoking officer
is satisfied that the magistrate who pronounced the judgment failed to warn the
defendant pursuant to section 335-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 0 Under
the rule in the instant case, the warning in section 335-a need not be given in a
case wherein there is no power to revoke the defendant's license upon conviction;
it is only on the particular conviction that yields the power to evoke that the
warning must be given.ST
49. See note 47, supra.
50. N. Y. CONST. art. III, §1.

51. Matter of Fink v. Cole, 302 N. Y. 216, 97 N. E. 2d 873 (1951). See also:

Packer Collegiate Institute v. University of State of New York, 298 N. Y. 184,
81 N. E. 2d 80 (1948); Matter of Small v. Moss, 279 N. Y. 288, 18 N. E. 2d 281

(1938).
52. 309 N. Y. at 59, 127 N. E. 2d at 807.

53. Marburg v. Cole, 286 N. Y. 202, 36 N. E. 2d 113 (1941).
54. American Power Co. v. Security & Exchange Commission, 329 U. S. 90

(1946).

55. N. Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §335-a.
56. N. Y. VEHICLE & TRAFFIC LAw §71, subd. 6 (last unnumbered paragraph).
57. See Johnston v. Fletcher,300 N. Y. 470 88 N. E. 2d 657 (1949); De Lynn
v. Mac Duff, 305 N. Y. 501, 114 N. E. 2d 12 (1953); De Martino v. Mealey, 284 N. Y.
231, 30 N. E. 2d 486 (1940).

